Abstract-The Smart Grid (SG) is an emerging modernized electrical power system with advanced monitoring and control mechanism, and improved fault-tolerance. Electric Vehicles (EVs), with their energy storage capability, are gaining popularity as an integral part of the energy management system in the SG. To balance the load-demand condition of the grid, EVs are required to schedule a charging event before participation. However, the information transmitted by an EV in charging events can reveal personal information of its owner. The privacypreserving methods for EVs in existing literature are based on anonymous authentication mechanism, where, missing a charging event by an EV is considered as malicious and the EV is penalized. However, missing a charging event may happen due to many valid reasons and flexibility of scheduling can encourage consumer participation. In this paper, an authentication method is proposed to achieve anonymity and flexibility in charging events for EVs. Additionally, a charging station network setup that divides a large regional area into smaller zones to improve privacy, is proposed. Results based on a MATLAB simulation are presented to demonstrate the Degree of Anonymity (DoA) achieved in different stages of the proposed method, the optimal number of missed charging events, and sub-division of zones.
I. INTRODUCTION
The information-centric Smart Grid (SG) converges traditional electrical power system with a bidirectional communication infrastructure. The bidirectional flow of electricity and information enables the incorporation of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) into the grid and reduces the dependency on diminishing fossil-based energy sources (e.g., coal, gas, etc.). Electric Vehicles (EVs), with their energy storage capability, are an essential part of the DER in the SG. As EVs are parked 95% of the time [1] , their batteries can be charged at night when the price is low and flowed back to the grid during peak time. This feature benefits both the utilities and the consumers by reducing the cost of reserved generators and providing dynamic pricing, respectively. An EV can store more than 10kWh of energy which is equivalent to the average energy demand per hour of 10 residential houses in the US. If a large number of EVs starts drawing energy simultaneously, the sudden electricity demand can create a mismatch between the generation and load, causing a deviation from the nominal grid operating conditions. Due to the large interconnection of power grid, a sudden mismatch can result in cascading system failures affecting large geographical areas. As a result, EVs as energy consumer and supplier are required to respond quickly to power commands. To schedule charging/discharging events with a Charging Station (CS) at a specified time, the EVs are required to transmit information such as State-ofCharge (SoC), current location, valid identity, expected time of arrival, etc. However, the information transmitted by the EVs can reveal personal information of the owner of the EV. It is possible by an electricity provider, data aggregator or a network of CSs to extract information such as the place of residence, travel patterns, visit to a hospital, etc. and create profiles of the owners of the EVs [2] .
The privacy-preserving methods for EVs that are found in the literature employ pseudonyms for different transactions by an EV to achieve location privacy [3] , and an authentication mechanism to ensure that the pseudonyms belong to valid EVs. Otherwise, malicious entities can randomly schedule charging events without participating. Missing a pre-scheduled charging event by an EV causes monetary loss to the CSs or electricity provider. As a result, in the existing literature, an EV not arriving in a scheduled event is considered as malicious and the corresponding EV is penalized (e.g., blacklisted, or refused further services) [4] . However, missing a scheduled event can happen due to different valid reasons such as road obstruction, road accident, GPS taking a different route, etc. Flexibility in scheduling can encourage more consumer participation in the demand management. On the other hand, the CSs should also get compensation for missed schedules. A mechanism is required which balances flexible charging events for the EVs and monetary loss to the CSs.
In this work, an anonymous authentication method is developed to achieve location privacy for the EVs. This method provides flexibility in charging schedules which enables an EV to charge at a reduced cost if it arrives within a pre-scheduled timing window and at a higher price if it misses the window. The proposed flexibility mechanism aims to balance electricity cost of the owner of the EV. Additionally, a network setup that sub-divides a regional area into smaller zones is proposed to prevent a single entity from having enough information to breach the privacy of EVs. In a MATLAB simulation, the anonymity in different scenarios are analyzed by a metric named Degree of Anonymity (DoA) [5] . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on privacy of EVs addressing flexible charging events with an analysis of DoA.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the privacy-preserving methods proposed in the literature. Section III gives a theoretical description of the methods used in the proposed work such as Blind Digital Signature, Partially Blind Signature and Degree of Anonymity. Section IV describes the system model, followed by the description of the proposed method in Section V. Section VI presents the analysis of the simulation results and Section VII presents the conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
To achieve location privacy, it is suggested that EVs use authenticated pseudonyms for different transactions, and the pseudonyms should not be associated with the real identity of its owner [3] . The method proposed in [6] addresses the privacy issues associated with an EV providing ancillary services to the grid. An ID-based partially blind digital signature method is used to enable EVs working as energy supplier to perform anonymous transactions (i.e., discharging operation). However, this method does not address the privacy of an EV as an energy consumer (i.e., charging operation). The anonymous protocol proposed in [7] addresses fair billing, and privacy against the owners of the CSs, for multiple users of the same vehicle. However, the electricity supplier of an EV can correlate its pseudonyms, charging sessions and original identity, and, determine the owner's movement.
An anonymous authentication method addressing malicious behavior of EVs is proposed in [4] . With the help of a Certificate Authority (CA) and a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), EVs use signed pseudonyms to schedule and participate in charging events with the CSs. If an EV does not arrive at a pre-scheduled time, it is considered as malicious and is blacklisted after recovering the original identity.
Authors in [1] proposed a batch authentication protocol to meet the stringent timing requirement in vehicular communications. This method does not address privacy of EVs against the aggregator. Similarly, the decentralized authentication mechanism proposed in [8] considers only external attackers in the adversarial model and does not address privacy against internal service providers. The method proposed in [9] enables the EVs to anonymously participate in charging events and generate receipts. This method requires the EVs to use high latency anonymizer such as MIX or TOR, and group signatures. However, this requirement demands significant change in the communication infrastructure, or computationally intensive operations by the EVs.
The authentication protocol proposed in [10] considers EVs in home mode and visiting mode, which is similar to the method proposed in this work. However, the method in [10] requires the presence of a virtual battery vehicle for privacy preservation. Moreover, [10] does not consider the flexibility of charging events for roaming EVs.
III. BACKGROUND A. Blind Digital Signature
The Blind Digital Signature (BDS) method [11] enables a user to get signature on a message without revealing the content of the message to the signer. In this subsection, a BDS method based on the RSA encryption scheme is described.
Suppose, the signer has a (public, private) key pair (pk, sk) for signing purposes only, where pk is publicly known, and sk is known only to the signer. According to the RSA algorithm, a signature on a message m is σ(m) = m sk mod N , where N is publicly known. If a verifier needs to check the signature, σ(m) is raised to the signer's public key pk. According to RSA algorithm, a valid signature follows, (σ(m)) pk modN = (m sk ) pk modN = m modN . In the BDS method, the user generates a random value r such that gcd(r, N ) = 1. Here, r works as a blinding factor to mask the original message, i.e., masked(m) = m × r pk modN . The signer signs the masked message instead of the original message, i.e., σ(masked(m)) = (masked(m)) sk mod N . The user unblinds the signed masked message and extracts the signed original message as follows.
As a result, the content of the message is hidden from the signer.
B. Partially Blind Signature
The Partially Blind Signature (PBS) method [12] is a variant of the BDS method. This method differs from BDS in that the signer and the user can agree on a common message. The signature is done on the common message and the blinded message. If inf o is the agreed common information, it is transformed into pk = hash(inf o) by a public hash function. The signer signs the blinded message and pk with its private key, sk. The signatures are bound to the public key pk, pk is bound to the signatures but remains unblind [12] .
C. Degree of Anonymity
Degree of Anonymity (DoA) is a metric that represents the level of anonymity achieved by the users of an anonymous system. Authors in [5] and [13] proposed DoA metrics based on information theory. Suppose, in a system of N users, p i is the probability that user i is in the anonymity set (set of possible users). If an adversary isolates S number of entities as possible members of the anonymity set, the DoA provided by the system is [5] ,
where,
p i = 1, and log 2 (N ) is the maximum DoA provided by the system. In [13] , the DoA of the system is not normalized by the maximum DoA. In this paper, we have used the metric proposed in [13] . This is because, as EVs are roaming entities, the maximum number of entities in a particular region is random (i.e., N is variable).
IV. SYSTEM MODEL

A. Network Setup and Adversarial Model
In the power grid, an Electric Utility (EU) provides energy services to different regional areas [6] . In this paper, it is assumed that every EV is subscribed to a primary EU (EU pr ), which manages its energy supply, billing, etc. The charging events are performed at different geographically dispersed CSs which receive energy from the supervising EU in its region.
In the proposed authentication method, an EV schedules a charging event via an EU. However, the aim is to prevent any service provider (i.e., EU, or CS) from correlating the charging events of an EV to its owner's identity. Therefore, we propose that every regional area under the supervision of an EU pr is further divided into zones of smaller areas. Each zone is supervised by a subsidiary entity (EU sub ). All the EU sub s in a region are supervised by the EU pr of that region. However, the division of an area denotes the division of information system (e.g., database, servers, etc.) rather than the electricity service. The motivations behind the subdivision are, 1) micro-management of smaller zones for efficient operation, 2) better scalability, 3) limited access to information of EVs, thus, better privacy and anonymity, etc. According to our proposed network setup, every regional EU pr has sub-utilities in charge of the information management of the EVs in smaller zones, i.e., EU 1 sub , EU 2 sub and EU 3 sub supervise zone 1, zone 2 and zone 3. The scheduling of charging events in each zone is managed by its supervising EU sub . In other words, when an EV moves from one zone to another, the management of its charging events is 'handed over' to a new EU sub . On the other hand, the CSs in a different regional area receive energy services from the supervising EU in that area. Hence, when a roaming EV moves from one regional area to another, scheduling of events is handed over to the visited EU (EU v ). In this work, an EU pr provides the authentication credentials to its valid customers to communicate with an EU v and the EU v provides the required credentials to the valid roaming EVs to schedule charging events with the CSs under its supervision. In this hierarchical approach, each entity is capable of checking the authenticity of an EV participating in a charging event without knowing the original identity of its owner.
The majority of the work in the literature considers the presence of a data aggregator which collects information from different entities for grid management. However, the presence of an aggregator is omitted in the network setup considered in this paper as the proposed method does not include interaction between an EV and the aggregator. Similarly, the presence of a certification authority for public key operations is implicit.
The adversarial model considers the EU and the CS as honest-but-curious. This model assumes that these entities do not deviate from the specified protocol but are interested in finding information about the owner of an EV.
B. Assumptions
1) Standard security protocols are followed in the communication among the entities. For example, transmitted messages are encrypted with a reliable encryption scheme (e.g., AES), mutual keys are set up with a secure key setup protocol (e.g., DHKE protocol), etc.
2) The simulation considers the arrival of EVs as a random
Poisson distribution. The charging events follow a standard M/M/1 queue system. The impact of factors such as electricity price, time of the day (i.e., peak/off-peak hour), load-demand condition, etc. on the arrival rate is not considered in the experiment. 3) An EV and its owner are considered as the same entity, and these two terms are used interchangeably. 4) There are more than one EV requesting the scheduling of charging events to an EU pr or an EU sub .
V. METHODOLOGY
Registration and Token Collection: We assume that every EV is registered with an EU as a valid subscriber with its original information such as name, address, Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), etc. After the registration, an EV and its EU pr agree on the authentication credentials (i.e., mutual keys) for future communication. The scheduling of charging events is done via different EU sub s and an EV requires an authenticated token to communicate with an EU sub . The EV receives the list of supervising EU sub s of different zones from the EU pr . Furthermore, it is assumed that the owner of an EV knows about its approximate movement in the upcoming days. This means the owner is aware of the battery status, the need for charging and the tentative route along which s/he prefers to charge the vehicle.
The first zone of preferred CS may not be the first zone in the route selected by a customer. Two cases of collection of tokens are considered, 1) the first zone is under the supervision of the EU pr , and 2) the first zone is under the supervision of an EU in a different region, i.e., EU v . In both cases, the EV generates and blinds a random token. The EV and the EU pr mutually agree on a common Inf o, which includes the time frame for which the token is valid (T val ). The validity time frame should be long enough to allow an EV to schedule charging events within its planned trip. Next, the EU pr signs the masked token and the common Inf o with a PBS method. In the former case, the signed token is used to communicate with the first EU sub . In the latter case, the signed token is used to communicate with the visiting EU (EU v ).
Selection of CSs: If the first CS is situated in a zone under the supervision of the EU pr , the EV sends an authentication request to the EU sub for scheduling a charging event.
where, Req(sch) contains the information required for scheduling (e.g., required energy, ε, timing window, TW for charging, route, etc.), Φ sub is the token for the EU sub , T val is the validity time frame for the token, and σ EUpr indicates that the contents are signed by the EU pr .
The EU sub checks the signature of the EU pr and the validity of the token. Next, the EU sub checks the availability of energy within the timing window at the CSs on the route. Depending on the availability, congestion of charging events, or predicted load-demand conditions, the EU sub selects a set of available CSs. Suppose, the CSs are recognized by different identifiers (ID CS ), which are unique in an area. The E sub creates a message (M cs ) consisting of ε, T W , and ID CS for each of the selected CSs, and sends the messages to the EU pr . The EU pr signs the messages using its private key and sends them back to the EU sub .
Next, the EU sub sends the M cs and the signed M cs to the EV.
If the first zone is under the supervision of a different EU (EU v ), the EV authenticates itself to the EU v using the token signed from its EU pr . The EU v provides an authentic EV the required credentials to communicate with the EU sub under its supervision. The communication with the EU sub s in the visited zone follows the same procedure as described before. The EV collects the authentication credentials from the present EU sub , to communicate with the next EU sub .
Scheduling of Charging Event: In this phase, the EV generates a set of pseudonyms for each of the selected CSs and the EU pr (or, EU v ) blindly signs the pseudonyms. Next, the EV forwards the list of pseudonyms associated with each CS to the EU sub .
From the scheduling requests of the EVs in an area (assumption 4), the EU sub makes lists of CSs and the corresponding requesting pseudonyms with their T W . For example,
where, ID CS1 , ID CS2 , ID CS3 are the IDs of different CSs and Φ 1 , Φ 2 , Φ 3 are the pseudonyms belonging to the same or different EVs, and the T W 1 , T W 2 , T W 3 are the corresponding charging timing window. Next, the EU sub forwards the set of pseudonyms and T W to the corresponding CS.
Participation in Charging Event: For a moving EV, there can be multiple routes to a destination. After an EV schedules for charging event, the available CSs distributed along its potential routes have the set of valid pseudonyms. The maximum distance (d max ) a moving EV can travel can be determined based on the current State-of-Charge (SoC), as d max ∝ SoC. Depending on the value of d max , the EV selects a CS and calculates the expected arrival time, t exp = d v , where, v is the speed of the EV and d is the distance from the CS. In current technology, smartphone navigation applications are fairly accurate in predicting the time of arrivals considering factors such as traffic conditions. The EV sends a request for participation in a charging event, which consists of a signed pseudonym, t exp , and the required energy (ε).
The CS checks the signature of EU pr on the pseudonym. If this signature is valid and if t exp is within the T W , this request is considered as valid. After the EV arrives at the CS, it participates in the charging event.
Flexible Charging Operation: If an EV does not arrive at a pre-scheduled event, it causes the CS some monetary loss because of the reserved time and energy. In this paper, we assume that in case of failing to meet a schedule, a penalty cost (C P ) is paid to the CS. The C P can be a fixed percentage of the electricity price (real-time or scheduled). Suppose, an EV reserved a charging event for U units of energy. The scheduled price (P Sch ) is referred to as the price of electricity determined when the charging event was scheduled and real-time price (P RT ) is the electricity price when bought without scheduling. If the EV provides a flat penalty cost for each of the missed CSs, the total penalty cost for missing m number of CSs is m * C P . The EV can afford to miss a scheduled charging event if the total scheduled energy cost is less than the total real-time energy cost,
where, C P (i) is the penalty cost for CSi. The maximum number of missed CSs affordable by the EV is the value of m for which the left side of (2) is equal to the right side. In this paper, three stages for the arrival of an EV are considered, 1) Timing Window (TW): the EV arrives at a CS within the designated TW, 2) Pre-Arrival (PrA): the EV arrives at a CS before its TW, and 3) Post-Arrival (PoA): The EV arrives at a CS after its TW has passed.
There are two cases of missing a scheduled charging event, 1) the EV missed the charging event after communicating with the CS, and there are other CSs situated on the routes which have its valid pseudonyms (sent by the EU sub ), 2) the EV has missed all the CSs in the pre-planned routes. In the former case, the EV reschedules charging event with another CS using a pseudonym and pays the scheduled price. In the latter case, the CSs in its route do not have its pseudonyms. In this scenario, it schedules a charging event with its token for the EU sub , signed by the EU pr and pays the real-time price.
VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we present a simulation-based study of the DoA achieved by the proposed method, cost-efficient number of missed CSs and the regional sub-division. The arrivals of EVs are independent and identically distributed Poisson process, and the arrival rate (λ) is varied from 0.1 to 0.9 at an interval of 0.2. In the plots against time slots, the X-axis shows the cumulative time slots (not the local clock time, e.g., 12AM). The DoA achieved by the system is determined by A. Variation of DoA in the Proposed Method Fig. 1 demonstrates the variation of DoA with varying λ in Pre-Arrival (PrA), Timing Window (TW) and Post-Arrival (PoA) stages of the proposed method, from the perspective of a roaming EV. In other words, this plot demonstrates the DoA achieved by an EV when it arrives at a CS in the PrA, TW or PoA. Each curve in the figure corresponds to the DoA achieved for a different λ. The value of λ corresponds to the number of arrivals, which in turn determines size of the anonymity set (i.e., DoA). It can be assumed that the EVs are interested in participating in a charging event within its TW to avoid the penalty cost. Moreover, each EV generates a single token to communicate with an EU sub or an EU pr , and multiple pseudonyms for the CSs. As a result, the number of participations using pseudonyms is larger than the number of participations using token. Therefore, in Fig. 1 , the λ shown in the legends are the arrival rates in the TW, and the arrival rates in the other two stages vary at a lower rate. It should be noted that the different values of λ do not indicate that the arrival rate in an area varies, rather, what changes are the number of transactions using token (in PrA and PoA) or pseudonyms (in TW). The legends in the figure show the total number of EVs that arrived in the three stages. The number of entities in an anonymity set indicates the number of possible customers participating in transactions. Therefore, in Fig. 1 , as more EVs arrive in the cumulative time slots in each stage, the anonymity set increases, hence, the DoA increases. Similarly, a higher λ yields a higher number of arrivals, thus, higher DoA.
B. Number of Missed CSs w.r.t. Electricity Price Fig. 2 shows the variation of number of missed CSs allowed by the proposed method with respect to (w.r.t.) the electricity price (real-time and scheduled) and the penalty cost. The allowed number of missed CSs means the maximum number of CSs an EV can miss when the price is cost-effective, which is derived from (2) . The X-axis shows the percentage of the P RT that equals the P Sch , where price is the total price and not the per unit price. According to the literature, price information is broadcast frequently to an EV. Depending on this price, an EV can decide how many CSs it can miss without spending more than the current electricity price.
C. Sub-division of a Regional Area
In this paper, we propose a network setup that sub-divides a region into smaller zones (under the supervision of different EU sub ). One of the motivations behind this network setup is to prevent an EU pr from having enough information to correlate a token or pseudonym to its owner's original identity. Suppose, there is no sub-division of areas. An EV collects blind tokens and schedules a charging event via the EU pr . If the time interval between the collection of token and scheduling is short, there might be cases when no other EV has scheduled an appointment. As a result, it would be possible for the EU pr to correlate this charging event with the identity of the owner of the EV, although, s/he used a blind token. On the other hand, in the proposed network setup, an EV collects token from the EU pr for the first EU sub on its route. Later, it collects tokens from one EU sub to communicate with the next EU sub . Hence, if an EU pr needs to correlate all the charging events of this EV, it needs to prevent all the EVs under the supervision of these EU sub s from scheduling.
In this subsection, we study how to determine the size of the sub-divided zones w.r.t. λ and DoA as shown in Fig. 3 . The arrival of EVs in this figure is shown for one of the three stages (e.g., PrA, TW or PoA). Fig. 3a depicts the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the arrivals associated with different λ. The cdf represents the probability that the mean number of arrivals (S mean ) in a time slot is less than a certain value. For example, for an arrival rate of 0.1, the probability that S mean is less than 10 is 1 (P rob(S mean < 10) = 1). On the other hand, for an arrival rate of 0.7 and 0.9, P rob(S mean < 15) = 0.1 and P rob(S mean < 15) = 0.05, respectively. The values from Fig. 3a are used to show the variation of probabilities of different S mean w.r.t. λ in Fig. 3b . On the other hand, From Fig. 3b , it can be seen that a λ ≤ 0.5 never achieves a mean arrival of 15, i.e., P rob(S mean < 15) = 1. On the other hand, a λ ≥ 0.7 has a higher probability (≥ 0.71) of achieving the desired S mean . Therefore, the desired arrival rate should be ≥ 0.7 to achieve the desired S mean (i.e., DoA). In Fig. 3c , the total number of arrived EVs for λ = 0.7 and λ = 0.9 are 198 and 273, respectively. As a result, the subdivision of a region into smaller zones should be such that the number of EVs in a zone is on average 200 ∼ 300.
Another method of determining the number of EVs in a zone is to compare the DoA in different cases. In Fig. 3c , the curves associated with λ = 0.1 and λ = 0.3 achieve lower DoA than the threshold DoA. The DoA achieved by λ = 0.5 is less than the threshold DoA in 40% (approx.) of the time. On the other hand, the DoA achieved by λ = 0.7 and λ = 0.9 are more than the threshold DoA in approximately 88% and 90% of the time. Hence, the desired arrival rate is 0.7 or 0.9. Consequently, we get the same conclusion.
VII. CONCLUSION
The efficiency of the operations in the smart grid depends on the ancillary services provided by the heterogeneous entities connected to it. Therefore, preserving the privacy of EVs is an important factor to encourage participation from consumer domain. In this paper, a method is proposed to achieve privacy and flexible charging events for EVs. Simulation results are presented to show the variation of Degree of Anonymity (DoA) at different stages of the proposed method, and costeffective number of missed CSs. Moreover, a network setup is proposed to achieve better privacy by sub-dividing a regional area into smaller zones. A method to determine the size of a sub-divided zone is demonstrated by the simulation results. Future works will focus on analysing the impact of factors such as electricity price, demand, etc., and the impact of subdivision of an area on the DoA.
